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Abstract: We present a quantum key distribution experiment in which
keys that were secure against all individual eavesdropping attacks allowed
by quantum mechanics were distributed over 100 km of optical fiber. We
implemented the differential phase shift quantum key distribution protocol
and used low timing jitter 1.55 µm single-photon detectors based on
frequency up-conversion in periodically poled lithium niobate waveguides
and silicon avalanche photodiodes. Based on the security analysis of the
protocol against general individual attacks, we generated secure keys at a
practical rate of 166 bit/s over 100 km of fiber. The use of the low jitter
detectors also increased the sifted key generation rate to 2 Mbit/s over
10 km of fiber.
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1. Introduction
Since the first demonstration of a quantum key distribution (QKD) system in 1992 [1], there
have been numerous efforts toward the implementation of such systems [2] with the goal of
making quantum cryptography practical by achieving the longest possible communication dis-
tance and the highest possible communication rate. The rapid progress in the field has re-
cently led to the implementation of fiber-based QKD systems that operated at 1 GHz clock
frequency [3, 4] and extended the key distribution distance to more than 100 km [4, 5, 6].
Most of the previous experiments, however, have not been able to guarantee the security of
the generated keys against general eavesdropping attacks. Often the average photon number per
pulse is set to the arbitrary value 0.1, which is not the result of a security proof. In the best cases,
only a limited set of potential eavesdropping attacks is taken into account. For implementations
of the BB84 protocol [7] with a Poisson source this set usually does not include the powerful
photon number splitting attack, rendering these systems ultimately insecure [8, 9]. Generation
of keys that were secure against general individual attacks and their distribution over 50 km of
optical fiber using the BB84 protocol with a Poisson source and InGaAs/InP avalanche photo-
diodes (APDs) with a very small dark count rate was reported in [10]. Furthermore, [6] and [11]
reported implementations of the decoy state BB84 protocol [12, 13], which achieved secure key
distribution over 107 km and 60 km of fiber using superconducting transition-edge sensors and
InGaAs/InP APDs, respectively. All these systems, however, featured a very small secure key
generation rate of <1 bit/s, which prevents their integration into practical telecommunication
networks.
In the experiment presented in [4], we implemented the differential phase shift quantum key
distribution (DPS-QKD) protocol, which uses a Poisson light source [14, 15] but is robust to
photon number splitting attacks [4, 16, 17]. In this implementation, the security analysis against
a limited set of eavesdropping attacks, in particular the beamsplitter, intercept-resend and pho-
ton number splitting attacks, was taken into account. Although it is important to demonstrate a
practical QKD system that is secure against these realistic attacks, it is also crucial to consider
more elaborate attacks that will be within technological reach in the near future and guarantee
the security of the system against these types of attacks. The security of the DPS-QKD protocol
against all individual attacks allowed by quantum mechanics, including photon number split-
ting attacks, was proven in [18]. Based on this security analysis, the experiment in [4] did not
generate secure keys over 105 km of fiber. The main limiting factor for the secure key distribu-
tion distance in this system was the large bit error rate caused by the broadening of the received
signal induced by the large timing jitter of the single-photon detectors employed in the system.
These detectors were based on frequency up-conversion in periodically poled lithium niobate
(PPLN) waveguides and Si APDs [19], and had a jitter of ∼ 500 ps. However, up-conversion
detectors using Si APDs with improved timing jitter characteristics were recently reported [20].
In this paper, we use the security analysis of the DPS-QKD protocol against general individ-
ual attacks and low jitter up-conversion detectors to implement a secure high speed and long
distance quantum key distribution system. The use of the low jitter detectors significantly im-
proved the signal to noise ratio, which resulted in a smaller bit error rate. Thus, despite the tight
security requirements, we achieved the distribution of keys that were secure against all individ-
ual attacks allowed by quantum mechanics over 100 km of optical fiber at a rate of 166 bit/s,
which is two orders of magnitude higher than previously reported values. Furthermore, using
the low jitter detectors allowed us to increase the sifted key generation rate to 2 Mbit/s over
10 km of fiber, which is double than the previous record [4].
2. Security of the differential phase shift quantum key distribution protocol
A quantum key distribution system that implements the DPS-QKD protocol is shown in Fig. 1.
Alice generates a train of coherent pulses, which are attenuated such that the average photon
number per pulse is less than 1, randomly phase modulated by 0 or pi , and sent over an optical
fiber to Bob. Each photon coherently spreads over many pulses with a fixed phase modulation
pattern. In the receiver side, Bob divides the incoming pulses into two paths and recombines
them using 50/50 beamsplitters. The time delay introduced by his interferometer is equal to
the inverse of the clock frequency, or else equal to the time separation between sequential
pulses. Single-photon detectors are placed at the output ports of the second beamsplitter. After
passing through Bob’s interferometer, the pulses interfere at the output beamsplitter and the
phase difference between two consecutive pulses determines which detector records a detection
event. Detector 1 in Fig. 1 records an event when the phase difference is 0 and detector 2 records
an event when the phase difference is pi . Because the average photon number per pulse is less
than one, Bob observes detection events only occasionally and at random time instances. Bob
announces publicly the time instances at which a photon was detected, but he does not reveal
which detector detected it. From her modulation data, Alice knows which detector in Bob’s
site recorded the event. Thus, by assigning bit values 0 and 1 to detection events recorded by
detector 1 and 2, respectively, they form a secret key.
Coherent light source
Alice
Optical fiber
DET1 (0)
Bob
PMATT
0 0 0pi(0,pi)
∆t
∆t
DET2 (1)
BS BS
Fig. 1. Quantum key distribution system for the implementation of the DPS-QKD protocol.
ATT, attenuator; PM, phase modulator; BS, beamsplitter; DET, detector.
In general terms, the security of the DPS-QKD protocol stems from the nondeterministic
collapse of a wavefunction in a quantum measurement. In particular, if the number of pulses in
the coherence time of Alice’s source is np, then each of Alice’s photons is in a superposition of
all the states that correspond to the np time instances with the appropriate phase applied to each
one of them. The overall wavefunction is a product state of these individual photon states. At
Bob’s site, a detection event at a certain time instance tn reveals the phase difference between
the pulses in time instances tn and tn+1, which corresponds to one bit of information. However,
these detection events occur completely randomly, so an eavesdropper cannot deterministically
collapse the wavefunction in the same time instance and obtain the same bit of information as
Bob.
The security of the DPS-QKD protocol against general individual attacks was rigorously
proven in [18]. This analysis considered a twofold eavesdropping strategy. Eve, the eavesdrop-
per, measures the photon number in the np-slot wavefunction using a quantum non-demolition
(QND) measurement. Then, she sends to Bob npµT photons, where µ is the average photon
number per pulse and T is the total transmission efficiency of the quantum channel and Bob’s
detection setup, and she stores npµ(1−T ) photons coherently to be measured after Alice and
Bob have revealed all classical information. This is the photon number splitting attack in the
case of the DPS-QKD protocol. In the case that Eve is assumed to store and measure her pho-
tons individually it was shown in [18] that she can obtain complete information for a fraction
2µ(1− T ) of the sifted key. When T ≪ 1 and µ is small this attack is relatively ineffective
for the DPS-QKD protocol. However, in the presence of system errors, Eve can also apply an
optimal measurement attack on a fraction of the photons transmitted to Bob. Assuming that
Eve attaches an individual probe state to each single photon, and then measures the probes in-
dependently after all classical information has been revealed, it was shown that the collision
probability for each bit pc0 is bounded as follows [18]:
pc0 ≤ 1− e
2−
(1− 6e)2
2
(1)
where e is the innocent system error rate.
Taking into account the results of the photon splitting and general individual attacks analysis,
the average collision probability for the n-bit sifted key, which is a measure of Eve’s mutual
information with Alice and Bob, is given by the expression:
pc = pnc0 =
[
1− e2−
(1− 6e)2
2
]n[1−2µ(1−T)]
(2)
Then, the shrinking factor applied during privacy amplification to guarantee the security of the
generated key is calculated as follows:
τ =−
log2 pc
n
=− [1− 2µ(1−T)] log2
[
1− e2− (1− 6e)
2
2
]
(3)
Finally, using the techniques of the generalized privacy amplification theory the secure key
generation rate after error correction and privacy amplification is given by the expression [8]:
Rsecure = Rsifted {τ + f (e) [e log2 e+(1− e) log2(1− e)]}
= Rsifted{−[1− 2µ(1−T)] log2[1− e2−
(1− 6e)2
2
]
+ f (e)[e log2 e+(1− e) log2(1− e)]} (4)
where the sifted key generation rate Rsifted is given by Eq. (5) below for the up-conversion
single-photon detectors and f (e) characterizes the performance of the error correction algo-
rithm. The QKD experiments presented in Sec. 4 are based on the results of the security analysis
described here, and in particular Eq. (4).
3. The low jitter up-conversion detector
In the 1.55 µm up-conversion single-photon detector [19], a single photon at 1.55 µm is com-
bined with a strong pump at 1.32 µm in a wavelength division multiplexing coupler, and subse-
quently the two beams interact in a PPLN waveguide, designed for sum frequency generation at
these wavelengths. This device allows for an internal conversion efficiency exceeding 99% of
the signal to the 713 nm sum frequency output. After a long-pass filter, a dichroic beamsplitter
and a prism that serve the purpose of eliminating the residual pump and its second harmonic,
the converted photon is detected by a Si APD. The up-conversion detector presents more favor-
able characteristics for fiber-based quantum cryptography than the commonly used InGaAs/InP
APD [16]. This is mainly because Si APDs have a low afterpulse probability, which enables
free-running or nongated Geiger mode operation. Thus, the sifted key generation rate in the
DPS-QKD system is only limited by the dead time of the Si APD, and is written as:
Rsifted = νµTe−νµTtd/2 (5)
where td is the detector dead time, ν the system clock frequency, and the factor 1/2 in the
exponent appears because the average number of photons per second that reach each detector in
Bob’s setup is νµT/2. For commercial Si APDs with a dead time on the order of 50-80 ns, the
exponential term becomes appreciable for low fiber losses and high count rates. The nongated
mode operation, however, does not impose any severe limitation on the QKD system clock
frequency, which is only determined by the speed of the electronic equipment and the Si APD
timing jitter. In the experiments described in this paper a clock frequency of 1 GHz was used,
while a 10 GHz system is also possible with these detectors [21].
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Fig. 2. Quantum efficiency and dark count rate of the low jitter up-conversion detector as a
function of pump power.
The quantum efficiency and dark count rate experimental data for the up-conversion single-
photon detectors with the low jitter Si APDs (MPDs) that were used for the QKD experiments
are shown in Fig. 2. The quantum efficiency of the MPD device at the output signal wave-
length of 713 nm is ∼ 25%, and so the maximum quantum efficiency of the up-conversion de-
tector, including the coupling, propagation, and collection setup losses, did not exceed 9% for
130 mW of pump power. The dark counts, on the other hand, increase approximately quadrat-
ically with the pump power because of parasitic nonlinear processes in the waveguide and the
input fiber [19].
In order to evaluate the performance of the low jitter up-conversion detectors for the DPS-
QKD system we perform timing jitter measurements. For these measurements, pulses with a full
width at half maximum (FWHM) of 66 ps at a repetition rate of 100 MHz are sent to the detector
and the detection signal is recorded with a time interval analyzer. Under these conditions, a
typical detection signal from the up-conversion single-photon detector with the low jitter Si
APD is shown in Fig. 3 for a count rate of 105 counts/s. As we observe in this figure, the FWHM
is 75 ps, which is significantly smaller than the 500 ps jitter obtained in experiments with high
jitter up-conversion detectors. Nevertheless, the detection signal is clearly not Gaussian; there is
a tail that can potentially cause errors in the adjacent 1 ns time slot in a DPS-QKD experiment
with a clock frequency of 1 GHz. Fig. 3 shows, however, that 1 ns away from the peak the
tail is sufficiently small to prevent intersymbol interference. It is clear that the improvement in
timing jitter achieved with the low jitter Si APDs is significant, and so the error rate should be
considerably lower in QKD systems employing these detectors.
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Fig. 3. Typical detection signal from the low jitter up-conversion detector when 66 ps pulses
are used. This curve corresponds to a count rate of 105 counts/s.
4. DPS-QKD experimental setup and results
The experimental setup for the quantum key distribution experiments that we performed at a
1 GHz clock frequency to implement the DPS-QKD protocol with low jitter up-conversion
single-photon detectors is shown in Fig. 4. At Alice’s site, a continuous wave light at 1.55 µm
1.55 µm cw
light source IM PM
(0,pi)
15 GHz 
PPG
1 GHz 
DG
Clock source
20 dB 
splitter
1%Power 
monitor 
99%
VATT VATTPC
Optical fiber
1 ns
66 ps
Temperature-controlled 
PLC Mach-Zehnder
interferometer
1.55 µm up-conversion 
single-photon detectors
Time Interval 
Analyzer
Logic 
unit
START
STOP 1 ns
DET1
DET2
PC
Fig. 4. Experimental setup for the 1 GHz DPS-QKD system. PC, polarization controller;
IM, intensity modulator; PM, phase modulator; VATT, variable attenuator; PPG, pulse pat-
tern generator; DG, data generator.
generated from an external cavity semiconductor laser was modulated into a coherent pulse
train with a 1 GHz clock frequency using a LiNbO3 intensity modulator. The modulator was
driven by a 15 GHz pulse pattern generator, so the pulse width was 66 ps. Subsequently, follow-
ing the DPS-QKD protocol that is illustrated in Fig. 1, the phase of each pulse was modulated
by 0 or pi with a LiNbO3 phase modulator. The phase modulation signal was a 1 Gbit/s pseudo-
random bit sequence with a length of 27−1 bits, which was generated by a data generator. The
pulses were appropriately attenuated and sent to Bob’s site through an optical fiber, where a
1-bit delay Mach-Zehnder interferometer based on planar lightwave circuit (PLC) technology
was installed. The insertion loss of the interferometer was 2 dB, and the extinction ratio was
greater than 20 dB. One 1.55 µm up-conversion single-photon detector was connected to each
of the output ports of the interferometer. The events detected by the two Si APDs were recorded
using a time interval analyzer.
In order to reduce the bit error rate caused by the large dark counts of the up-conversion
detector we set the pump power at relatively low levels, at the expense of reduced quantum
efficiency and thus reduced key generation rate as well. To further reduce the bit error rate due
to dark counts we applied a time window to the recorded data. Because of the improved timing
jitter characteristics of the up-conversion detector, which induces a small pulse broadening
as illustrated in Fig. 3, the signal counts are concentrated in small time segments while the
dark counts are randomly distributed. Therefore, we can use short measurement time windows
to reduce the effective dark counts and improve the signal to noise ratio. This results in a
significantly smaller bit error rate.
Before performing QKD experiments, we set the average photon number per pulse µ at its
optimal value. In particular, based on the experimental parameters of the system, we maximized
the secure key generation rate with respect to µ using Eq. (4) which corresponds to the general
individual attacks security analysis. The optimal value was 0.2. Subsequently, we performed
QKD experiments, that is we measured the generation rate of the sifted keys that Alice and Bob
exchanged, and by directly comparing the yielded keys we also measured the bit error rate of
the transmission. For each fiber length, we measured the sifted key generation rate and error
rate five times and took the average values. We then calculated the secure key generation rate
from Eq. (4) using the experimental results for the sifted key generation rates and bit error rates.
Alice and Bob were located in the same room and we performed fiber transmission experiments
using fiber spools, while some additional data were taken with an optical attenuator simulating
fiber loss. Fig. 5 shows the theoretical curves and experimental results for the sifted and secure
key generation rate as a function of fiber length that we obtained with the described setup and
procedure for two different experimental conditions.
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
Fiber length (km)
Se
cu
re
 k
ey
 g
en
er
at
io
n 
ra
te
 (b
its
/s)
(a) 
(b) 
10 km 
25 km 
75 km 
100 km 
Fig. 5. Secure and sifted key generation rate as a function of fiber length for two cases.
(a) The dashed and solid curves are theoretical predictions for the sifted and secure rate,
respectively, when η = 6% and d = 1.95×10−5 . The clear diamond and square are the ex-
perimental fiber transmission data for the sifted and secure key generation rate under these
conditions. The clear stars and circles are the data taken with attenuation used to simulate
additional fiber loss. (b) The dashed and solid curves are the theoretically predicted sifted
and secure rate, when η = 0.4% and d = 3.5×10−8. The filled diamonds and squares are
the experimental fiber transmission data under these conditions. The filled stars and circles
are the simulated attenuation data. A baseline system error rate of 1.5% is assumed in all
theoretical calculations.
We first set the detector operating condition to levels appropriate for achieving high speed
quantum key distribution over a short communication distance. More specifically, the quan-
tum efficiency and dark count rate of the low jitter up-conversion detectors were set to 6% and
98 kHz, respectively. These values do not correspond to the same pump power level in Fig. 2
because the performance of the detectors was slightly degraded when the QKD experiments
were performed compared to when the quantum efficiency and dark count rate data were taken.
We set the time window width to 200 ps, so the dark counts per time window in these experi-
ments were d = 1.95× 10−5. The use of the 200 ps time window also decreased the effective
quantum efficiency by 40%. Under these operating conditions, we performed QKD experiments
for 10 km of optical fiber. The curves (a) of Fig. 5 correspond to the theoretical prediction for
the sifted and secure key generation rate under these experimental conditions, when µ is opti-
mized to maximize the secure key generation rate using the general individual attacks security
analysis. A baseline system bit error rate of 1.5% was assumed in these calculations. The clear
square represents the fiber transmission experimental result for the secure key generation rate,
while the sifted key generation rate at the corresponding fiber length is represented by the clear
diamond. The clear circles and stars show the experimental results when we simulated addi-
tional fiber loss with an optical attenuator. As we observe in Fig. 5, the theoretical curves fit
very well with the experimental results. At the fiber length of 10 km we achieved a sifted key
generation rate of 2 Mbit/s with a bit error rate of 2.2%, thus the secure key generation rate
at this fiber length was 0.468 Mbit/s. The use of the low jitter detectors resulted in a double
sifted rate at small fiber loss compared to previous experiments with high jitter up-conversion
detectors [4] because of the significantly reduced error rate.
Subsequently, we set the quantum efficiency, dark count rate, and time window width to
0.4%, 350 Hz and 100 ps, respectively, to further reduce the errors caused by dark counts and
thus improve the signal to noise ratio to achieve long distance quantum cryptography. The use
of the 100 ps time window set the dark counts per time window to d = 3.5× 10−8, and also
reduced the effective quantum efficiency of the detector by 54%. Under these operating condi-
tions, we performed QKD experiments for 25, 75 and 100 km of optical fiber. The curves (b)
of Fig. 5 correspond to the theoretical prediction for the sifted and secure key generation rate
when the above experimental conditions are assumed. The filled squares and diamonds repre-
sent the fiber transmission experimental results, while the filled circles and stars correspond to
data taken using the attenuator to simulate additional fiber loss. Again, we observe that the theo-
retical curves fit very well with the experimental data. By using these operating conditions, keys
that were secure against general individual eavesdropping attacks were distributed at a rate of
166 bits/s over 100 km of fiber. The bit error rate for the 100 km experiment was 3.4%, of which
1% is attributed to imperfect interferometry, 1.7% to detector dark counts, and the remaining
0.7% to the timing jitter. This result shows that the key distribution distance for which security
against all individual attacks allowed by quantum mechanics is guaranteed for the DPS-QKD
protocol was considerably extended because of the improved timing jitter characteristics of the
up-conversion detectors employed in the system. These characteristics led to small pulse broad-
ening, which allowed the use of a short measurement time window to substantially reduce the
effective dark counts, thus improving the signal to noise ratio and decreasing the bit error rate.
5. Conclusion
We presented a practical and secure quantum key distribution system that implemented the dif-
ferential phase shift quantum key distribution protocol with low jitter up-conversion detectors.
We showed that the improved timing jitter characteristics of the detectors allowed us to signifi-
cantly increase both the key distribution rate and distance of the DPS-QKD system, while at the
same time guaranteeing its security against the most general individual eavesdropping attacks
allowed by quantum mechanics. With this system we achieved a 2 Mbit/s sifted key generation
rate with a corresponding secure key generation rate of 0.468 Mbit/s over 10 km of optical fiber,
and secure key distribution over 100 km of fiber at a rate of 166 bit/s, which is two orders of
magnitude higher than previously reported values.
The quantum cryptography system we presented achieves a sufficiently high communication
rate and a long enough communication distance to be able to operate in a standard telecom-
munication network. However, the system’s capabilities can be further extended by improving
the dark count behavior of the up-conversion detectors and the timing jitter characteristics
of the Si APDs. The dark counts caused by noise photons generated via spontaneous Raman
scattering can be reduced by using a shorter signal wavelength than pump wavelength, while
single-photon detectors with a Gaussian response and narrow FWHM based for example on
photomultiplier tubes may soon become available. This will open the way to megahertz secure
key generation rates and very long distance secure communication.
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